DISCLAIMER:
THIS ARE ONLY MEMORIES –
AIMING FOR CORRESPONDENCE
WITH REALITY BUT CANNOT
GUARANTEE IT.

memory slices

by Anna Strasser

Mon 13

1. Marta Jorba: On the Inseparability of Social Categories and their Relations

2. Isaac Wilhelm: Pluralities, Counterparts, and Groups

3. Hans Bernhard Schmid: Plural Subjects – The Social Ontology of Us

4. Bastien Gauchot: The Identification of Collective Efforts in a Force-Based Framework

5. SYMPOSIUM: Juan Pablo Bermudez: Joining forces: The nature and norms of collective efforts

6. Marcell Székely: "Social Effort Calibration. Why, when and how do we match joint action partners' effort investments?"

7. Olle Blomberg: "Effort and collective quality of will"

8. Wayne Christensen "Sense of Effort, Joint Action, and the Evolution of Flexible Skill"

9. Jonas Werner: Plenitude and Self-Identification

10. Mattias Gunnemyr: Moral Responsibility for Outcomes in Collective Harm Cases

11. Bernd Prien: Looping Effects and the Stability of Social Practices

12. KEYNOTE: Dan Zahavi: We in me or me in we. Collective intentionality and the plural subject.

13. Lucia Angelino: Thinking the genesis of a group behaviour and of group thoughts. Sartre's alternative framework

14. Alexander Leferman: How to explain spontaneous group actions

15. Lorenzo Passerini Glazel: On the Complex Ontology of Norms: from Deontic Sentence to Deontic Noema

16. Zachary Auwerda: Group Emotions

Marta Jorba: On the Inseparability of Social Categories and their Relations

Intersectionality: interactions among multiple social categories affect people's experience

- social categories interrelate in complex ways / produce specific forms of oppression

theoretical & philosophical perspective:
- inseparability of social categories
- social categories relate with each other in complex ways

critic of mutual constitution model view:
- operates with a reified conception of social categories (→ different metaphors of intersectionality)

ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK: → CATEGORIES AS PROPERTIES OF INDIVIDUALS
emergent intersectional property view: relation among social categories according to which intersectional properties are wholes constituted by certain configurations of social categories' effects

→ multiplicity of specific empirical relations (such as intensification, mitigation, etc.) to occur among social categories,
→ making it a plural view on the relation question

Isaac Wilhelm: Pluralities, Counterparts, and Groups

THEORY OF GROUPS BASED ON PLURALITIES & COUNTERPARTS

- a group = plurality of entities at a time

- counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal and temporal sentences about groups

- akin to the stage theory of material objects:
  - both take the items they analyze to exist at a single time
  - both use counterparts to satisfy certain conditions relating to the modal properties, temporal properties, and coincidence properties of those items

Hans Bernhard Schmid:
Plural Subjects – The Social Ontology of Us

READ THE UPCOMING BOOK

Bastien Gauchot: The Identification of Collective Efforts in a Force-Based Framework

force-based analysis of individual efforts to collective ones

- effort predications
  - precise the way in which an action is performed by informing the audience that the agent must resist to some force for her action to succeed

- collective efforts with respect to
  i. the resistance encountered by the agents
  ii. the goal they pursue even though they don't face the same resistance
  iii. both the goal they pursue and the resistance they face

What are collective efforts then?
- (a) Resistance-based identification.
- (b) Goal-based identification.
- (c) Resistance-and-goal-based identification.

Joining forces: The nature and norms of collective efforts

Convenor:

Juan Pablo Bermúdez (U Neuchâtel)

Speakers:

- Marcell Székely (CEU).
  - "Social Effort Calibration. Why, when and how do we match joint action partners' effort investments?"
- Olle Blomberg (U Gothenburg):
  - "Effort and collective quality of will"
- Wayne Christensen (University of Barcelona).
  - "Sense of Effort, Joint Action, and the Evolution of Flexible Skill"

General presentation

individual level of feeling of effort: part of the sense of agency / calibrate how successfully the action is going / or worth continuing

- **collective level: ???**

How the feeling of effort and perceptions of others' efforts, guides and structures joint action performance.

- each individual must factor *'how to share the load*' into the decision how much effort to put into the action
- stay committed to a joint action only if others do the same – otherwise we risk being exploited by slackers or making efforts in vain
- → capable of perceiving others' efforts and match their own efforts to those of others.

But how do we sense the efforts of others?
- perception of effort versus feeling of our own effort / how to match our own level of effort and commitment to others in contributing to joint actions

Wayne Christensen: Sense of Effort, Joint Action, and the Evolution of Flexible Skill

understanding effort allocation in joint action

→ account of mechanisms & functions of effort awareness

muscular & cognitive effort ? opportunity cost? a revised energy theory ?

architectural perspective:
sense of effort = cluster of high level 'senses' with action-guiding role (+ senses of agency & control)

- integrate perceptual & motor information with conceptual task information (like sense of direction)

- guide the allocation of effort in an ecologically optimal way
    - → effort is not always aversive, expending too little effort can also be aversive

- conative significance of effort signals will be context-sensitive (sensitive to dissimilarities in partner abilities and motivation, such as when a partner is young, old, sick, injured, a novice, experienced-but-incompetent, unmotivated...)
    - requirements for individual and joint benefit, collective efficiency

Marcell Székely: Social Effort Calibration. Why, when and how do we match joint action partners' effort investments?

comparing effort levels in joint action crucial for evaluating feasibility of interaction / calibrating our own energy expenditure / making decisions about partner selection

- perception of a partner's effort → increasing our own effort level in a joint task
  (Székely & Michael, 2018; Chennells & Michael, 2018)

- analysis of the functions potentially subserved by effort matching

  (H1) reward distribution sensitivity hypothesis: shared rewards → increased effort
  - confirmed by E1

  (H2) effort-inequity-aversion hypothesis
  - inconclusive support by E1 / supported by experiment 2

  (H3) salience of social factors auxiliary hypothesis
  - confirmed by E1

Olle Blomberg: Effort and collective praise-and blame worthiness

praise-and blame worthiness can come in degrees

- 1st order efforts: striving against physical resistance

- 2nd order efforts: striving against aversion to 1st order efforts

- an agent's accumulated E-directed efforts increases her degree of praiseworthiness for bringing the good end E about

- Effort is a historical factor that directly increases praiseworthiness.
- *Accumulated collective effort:* A group's accumulated E-directed efforts increases their degree of praiseworthiness for bringing E about.
- In highly interactive collective activities, participants perform interpersonal efforts and *Accumulated collective effort* leads to a sort of responsibility gap.

Accumulated Effort

- An agent's degree of praise- or blameworthiness for intentionally bringing about some end E is increased by

(i) her exerted E-directed effort as well by

(ii) her past accumulated E-type directed efforts which has made bringing about E less effortful.

Jonas Werner: Plenitude and Self-Identification

SOCIAL PROPERTIES - CENTRAL TO IDENTITY

distinction between identity-constituting properties & other less central properties

- captured in terms of essence

- reasons to not claim that persons essentially belong to social categories

  1. some features can be lost and gained over a lifetime
  2. person's existence seems not dependent on there being some social category like womanhood

centrality of features to persons identities in terms of essence

- without giving features any special metaphysical weight

- taking them to be immutable

- matter of context what is relevant in social interactions

- considerations of charity

  - practice of contextual self-identification enables speakers to truthfully say of themselves that they instantiate social properties essentially

Mattias Gunnemyr: Moral Responsibility for Outcomes in Collective Harm Cases

COLLECTIVE HARM CASES:

- blameworthy for causing climate change by going for a leisure drive with a gas-guzzling car / even though your action seems to make no morally relevant difference for climate change and its related harms

- blameworthy because of **poor quality of will** caused this outcome
  - blameworthy for X rather than X* just in case (i) X is worse than X*, and (ii) there is a time t, such that your poor quality of will at t in relation to X versus X* caused X rather than X*.

poor quality of will: insufficient regard or to care insufficiently for something (e.g. an outcome)

- alternative account of causation can avoid difficulties

- poor quality of will caused an outcome X just in case
  - (a) your poor quality of will is process-connected to X, and
  - (b) in the closest-to-@-at-t world where you do not have a poor quality of will, X is less secure, and X* is more secure than they are in @.

- threshold cases (such as Björnsson's 2014 The lake)

- non-threshold cases (such as Parfit's 1984 Drops of Water)

Bernd Prien: Looping Effects and the Stability of Social Practices

I.   **more complex**

Haslanger: communally shared schemata

- implausible: because individuals have different views, observation will not lead to shared schemata

II.   **reinforced shared schemata**

Haslanger: first-hand observation = main source of reinforcement

- BUT also testimony of others plays an important role (schemata are subject to public debate)

more complex view
causal chain from the resource to a collectively shared schema:

- resources impinge on the experiences of the members of all social groups, though members of different groups will have different experiences
- powerless social groups → causal chain ends
- powerful social groups→ continues testimonially to the other agents

Sally Haslanger's claim: social practices are stabilized by looping effects

practices are constituted by **resources** *(agents & material objects)* and **schemata** *(how we conceive of them)*

two causal connections constitute loops that hold social practices stable

1.   schema → resources: shaped according to the schemata *(streets are built such that they facilitate driving in cars, while ruling out other possible uses)*

2.   resources → schemata: we observe the resources and find that they conform to our schemata

Dan Zahavi:
We in me or me in we. Collective intentionality and the plural subject.

- **NOT: The WE prior to the I, the you**
- **NOT: The I, the you, and the WE are equiprimordial**

→ **The I and an the you are prior to the WE.**

Rabbi Menachem Mendel Morgensztern of Kotzk (1787-1859)

- "If I am I, because you are you, and you are you, because I am I, then I am not I, and you are not you. But if I am I because I am I, and you are you because you are you, then I am I and you are you, and we can talk."

Lucia Angelino:
Thinking the genesis of a group behaviour and of group thoughts. Sartre's alternative framework

"we" is a primitive and unconditioned phenomenon, (Schmidt 2005, 2009, 2014; Searle 1995)

"we" arises out of a dyadic I-you relationship. (Zahavi 2016; Tomasello 2014).

- focus on far more complex, polycentric and mediated configurations of the "we",
    - go beyond the here and now of a concrete face-to-face interaction and involve the plural positions of 'you' and 'they'
    - shift the theoretical focus from the "You" to the "Third" (from dyadic relationship to ternary relations of "mediated reciprocity"
- "third party" is to be understood — as a third agent or as an internal observer — rather than as an external enemy or as a realm of being (e.g., a shared object or a common project). The third party is 'another' whose functions are different from the 'first other', or the alter ego.

1. dyadic model (Dan Zahavi)

2. Sartre's account and attempt to reconstruct his arguments for shifting the theoretical focus from dyadic relation of reciprocity, to ternary relations of "mediated reciprocity" involving a "third party".

3. explore the epistemological and heuristic potential of this alternative framework for contemporary debates on the genesis of the "we"

Alexander Leferman:
How to explain spontaneous group actions

SPONTANEOUS GROUP ACTIONS:
no interaction before they begin acting together

- essential feature of group action: co-agential perspective agents have towards one another as agents acting together
    - we-attitudes (Tuomela & Miller 1988), practical intersubjectivity (Roth 2003), intentional co-participant (Bratman 2014)
- co-agential perspective on fellow agents → co-agents are bound together → spontaneous group actions are possible

'*internalism about group action*' cannot account for spontaneous group actions

- knowing the other's intention is crucial and at the same time interactions appear to be necessary

'*externalism about group action*':

- external element (not the agents' attitudes) partly explains a group's action. no need for interaction
- external element= normative group-reason
- If two or more people respond to a normative group-reason, then they would not need to interact with each other in order to act together. The group reason would bind them together in spontaneous group action.

Lorenzo Passerini Glazel: On the Complex Ontology of Norms: from Deontic Sentence to Deontic Noema

What is a norm? - no general agreement

- 7 possible referents of the word 'norm': *deontic sentence*, deontic utterance, *deontic proposition*, deontic state-of-affairs, deontic noema, deontic conduct and deontic object
  - philosophy of law focus on deontic sentence or deontic proposition → linguistic entities which are the product of specific linguistic normative acts
  - existence of non-linguistic and language-independent norms.
  - customary norms established before and independently of their linguistic formulations. I will construe such customary norms in terms of "athetic deontic states-of-affairs",

    norm-creating acts— experience of norms

norms = "deontic noemata" correlated to specific "deontic noeses"

- only presupposition: human beings, as "nomic animals" are capable of having such normative experiences that all the remaining levels of normative phenomena make sense

- LANGUAGE is not a necessary precondition for NORMS (→ non-human animals, infants, thought before language)

Tue 14

1. Raffaela Giovagnoli: Habits, We-Intentionality and Rituals
2. Judith Martens: Habits, Normativity, and Joint Action
3. Niels de Haan: Interconnected Blameworthiness
4. Ajinkya Deshmukh: Groups and Group Identity: A Deontic Account
5. Thomas Brouwer: Conventions, Counterfactuals and Populations
6. Alba Lojo Caride: A reconstruction of constitutive rules
7. Robert Williams: Publicity and common commitment to believe
8. Benjamin Elliot Curtis: The Party as Corporate Agent
9. Alex Bryant: Joint Commitment-Based Legal Human Rights: With and Against Gilbert
10. Michael Wilby: Moral Responsibility and Variable Frame Theory
11. Michael Schmitz: Legal positivism and collective acceptance
12. Giulio Sciacca & Pietro Ingallina & Tommaso Ostillio: The Metaphysics of Online Herd Behavior

Raffaela Giovagnoli:
Habits, We-Intentionality and Rituals

understand human behavior in ordinary life

- Aristotle: ability to intend habits through the process of "habits learning"
  - central topic in neuroscience and neurobiology.
- dimensions of habitual behavior and its extension to the social world
- relationship between habitual behavior, We-intentionality and rituals as social habits.

Judith Martens
Habits, Normativity, and Joint Action

current understanding of joint action /shared agency

→idea of rationality as coherence

→idea of rationality as all things considered

→**normativity is built into these theories**

- presuppose rationality & assumptions about common knowledge

BUT this account of rationality does not apply to a good deal of human actions

- phenomena classify as unintentional, automatic, non-agentic

HABITUAL JOINT ACTIONS →? → NORMATIVITY

- How can we retain rationality as a normative criterion for individual and joint action, given the indicated role of habits?
  - → pragmatist approaches on habit (Bourdieu)
  - dispositions

Niels de Haan:
Interconnected Blameworthiness

3 factors :

- shared intentionality

- interpersonal influence

- common knowledge

degree of blameworthiness versus scope of blameworthiness

- the more each factor is present, the greater the scope of each agent's vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents' contributions to the harm

- agent controls her degree of blameworthiness—but even here, luck constrains what possible degrees of blameworthiness are open to her

Portion Principle: Each agent is blameworthy for a different portion of what the group is blameworthy for, with no overlap between agents' portions. (Lewis 1948)

Overlap Principle: Each agent is blameworthy for a portion of what the group is blameworthy for, with some overlap between agents' portions. (May 1992)x`

Full Scope Principle: Each agent is blameworthy for the totality of what the group is blameworthy for. There is complete overlap between agents' portions. (Kutz 2000)

Thomas Brouwer: Conventions, Counterfactuals and Populations

Iris Einheuser's (2003, 2006) theory of conventional facts

- **counterfactual supposition about facts** and **conventions**
  - **a space of 'substrates'** (worlds without conventional facts)
  - **a space of 'carvings'** (functions from substrates to worlds with social facts)

modelling phenomenon of cultural variation

- qualifiers like 'for the French' or 'in Chinese culture'
  - qualifying such claims to avoid saying *that one must dress only in black and only in white*
  - understand qualifications intuitively, but unexplored how we should characterize their function in terms of the metaphysics of social facts

carving operators may help to model this kind of cultural variation

- certain limitations: overgenerate social facts

overcome limitations:

- idea of fine-graining space of substrates by introducing 'population-centred' substrates
- distinguish more finely between ways of shifting the carving by which we evaluate a situation

Alba Lojo Caride
A reconstruction of constitutive rules

John Searle's theory of constitutive rules in light of of Amadeo Conte's theory of the regola eidetico-costitutiva

- distinction between constitutive and regulative rules

- proposal of constitutive rules
    - objection to critique by Lewis and Ross
    - understand violation of a constitutive rule while players still playing the game (Williamson, Garcia Carpintero)
    - expanding to the nature of the rule of recognition

Robert Williams: Publicity and commitment to believe

public information →matters for accounts of rational choice

standard analysis = variant of common belief:

for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so forth .....

identification of publicity with common belief without appeal to either theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases

- characterize a practical-normative role for information being public & show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized

role of "taking a proposition for granted" in non-isolated decision making → minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held

THESIS: taking a proposition for granted in the relevant sense = believe that it is public
→ expressivist analysis of publicity

→common belief can be derived from the premises above

→FOR A PROPOSITION TO BE PUBLIC, ALL MUST BE COMMON COMMITTED TO BELIEVE THE PROPOSITION

FOR TECHNICAL DETAILS ENJOY THE HANDOUT ON THE WEBSITE

Benjamin Elliot Curtis: The Party as Corporate Agent

List & Pettit 'Group Agency':
holistic supervenience view of the relationship between individual members of a group and the group as a whole

→ reject eliminative view *(groups = metaphysical fiction, talk of group phenomena is metaphorical)*

→ reject emergence view *(group is a new metaphysical entity over and above its individual members)*

- groups with joint intention and an organizational structure have group agency

  - organizational structure determines the kind of agency of the group *(functionally explicit or inexplicit organizational structures)*

CLAIM: organizational structure of the party, as described in the Marxist tradition, is best described in this manner

- → organizational structure of the party are a central political question

- Even though List and Pettit might initially reject the insights from the Marxist tradition as emergentist, I argue that their own account is much closer to it they might admit.

Alex Bryant: Joint Commitment-Based Legal Human Rights: With and Against Gilbert

Margaret Gilbert: *"there is less reason to think that the individual human inhabitants of the world are in a position to address authoritative demands to states that oppress them."*

- existence of contemporary human rights frameworks is not sufficient to grant citizens standing to demand states' compliance

BUT 'population common knowledge' & 'political obligation' → joint commitment → individual citizens' demand-rights against a state

- members of political societies
  - make a Gilbertian commitment to uphold that society's legal system become specific duty-bearers
  - hold demand-rights against specific duties state actors and violation of legal human rights
- (1) citizens' joint commitment to upholding a Hartian rule of recognition in their legal system
- (2) through the legislation of human rights frameworks

key problem:
→ establishing sufficient common knowledge among members of the population of (1) a shared conception of the population itself & (2) the readiness of their fellow citizens to join together in accepting a commitment

Michael Wilby: Moral Responsibility and Variable Frame Theory

'Paradox of Immorality' makes it seem that it is not possible to rationally, knowingly and intentionally commit an immoral act.

→ How to act immorally despite fulfilling all three conditions (motivation control epistemic) of moral actions?

- rational but not based on reasons --- quasi-rational

CLAIM: Bacharach's Variable Frame Theory provides a framework to solve the puzzle

- right we-frame → prioritize moral reasons over self-interest

- knowing the we-frame but still act according the I frame

Michael Schmitz: Legal positivism and collective acceptance

core claim of legal positivism:

- law depend not on its moral merits, but on its sources *(social structures & processes from which it originates)*
- rejects natural law tradition (be a law 'naturally', without a proper social, institutional context)

CLAIM: it is not sufficient to establish the core claim of positivism with its sharp separation of law and morality

- **take up an observational stance towards the law, but not towards morality**

    (1) Can something be a law indepedently of its acceptance?

    (2) Is acceptance plausibly independent of their moral attitudes?

    (3) Acceptance is holistic: legal order as a whole can remain in force even if specific laws lack acceptance

    (4) Acceptance is a somewhat vague and elastic notion, the law being in force is plausibly construed as being a special case of it.

    (5) The law being in force requires that the legal order is accepted in the society at large.

    (6) Relevant acceptance constituting attitudes are not mere beliefs, but have an irreducibly practical aspect.

    (7) pushmi-pullyu representations

CLAIM: It remains plausible that acceptance of a legal order will crucially depend on moral attitudes.

LAW ITSELF AS AN INSTITUTIONALIZED FORM OF MORALITY

Giulio Sciacca & Pietro Ingallina & Tommaso Ostillio:
The Metaphysics of Online Herd Behavior

social groups

- Type 1 structure: each group member plays a specific within the social structure of their group (e.g. a goalkeeper in a football team)
- Type 2 structure: group members are typified by common primitive individual characteristics (e.g. people of the same ethnicity)

NEW: Type-3 structured groups: Not only result of an agreement or shared goals but also of herd behavior, triggered by social conformity & group polarization.

main components:

1. atomic behavior of their members (C1)

2. relations between their members (C2)

3. entity that identifies the structure of Type-3 groups (C3)

→ persisting entities because dynamic evolution of C3 is recursively reducible to changes in C2 and in turn to changes in C1.

- stable property cluster (not entail instance-stability → structure of Type-3 groups dynamically changes, but it addresses the problem of why Type-3 persist

- flow information postulate → account for both the aggregation and the disintegration of Type-3 groups

- examples: social and political phenomena
  - (e. g. the rise of populistic movements or parties in Europe and the US, the formation of no-vax, conspiracy-theory, or paramilitary groups), develop in the same way as Type-3 groups.

Nicolas Kleinschmidt: Men Made Objects. A Problem for the Philosophy of Artifacts

reducible & irreducible types of collective authorship

collective authorship - born by more than one agent

- reducible if and only if it is distinguishable into authorships of individual properties of the artifact
- irreducible if and only if it cannot be distinguished into individual authorships of individual properties of the artifact

- reducible collective authorship recordings
    - recorded realizations of the compositions can be clearly distinguished into the realization of the piano, bass, and drums

- irreducible collective authorship of the compositions
    - → compose songs jointly intentional actions, which constitute their joint composing, do not correspond to clearly distinguishable characteristics of their compositions

Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani: Constitutive Rules of Institutions. Two Aspects

essentialist & conventionalist framework of social practices

show that in whichever framework we choose to explain the emergence of social institutions, we had better be disposed with the distinction between definitional and essential rules.

- "essential rules" — corresponding to nonconventional aspects
  - related to values, operate on a deeper level, and underlie, in an essential way, those institutions themselves.
  - trans-institutional concept
  - A. Reinach: "essential laws": immediate intelligibility & non-forgettability

- "definitional rules" — corresponding to conventional aspects
  - give meaning to activities within those institutions and define those activities;
  - intra-institutional concept.
  - Marmor's "conventionalist" account of social practices (Marmor A., 2009) → concepts of surface versus deep conventions

day 3

Marco Emilio: The Ontological Side of Tackling Online Misinformation

Multiple phenomena of on-line misinformation → new risks of manipulation of personal political opinions

- conceptual failures in promoting cooperation among individual & social subjects directed to transparency and privacy
    - public policies unable to supply the public good of a healthy and safe online environment

→ ontological analysis of coordinated actions, collective goods, individual & plural subjects

- standard economic goods categorization
    - mainstream economic categorization of Private and Public goods
    - lack of cooperation between individual and collective actors
    - shape the way in which social collaboration is conceived by public institutions
    - making them incapable of initiating and promoting basic, as well as, complex forms of cooperation necessary to manage online risks.

    different kind of taxonomy:

- ontological taxonomy of social and economic goods based on the concept of cooperation
    - Tuomela (2013) and Pettit (2015)

Katrina Haaksma: Ameliorating our concepts of sexuality: considerations

frequent appeals to 'naturalness' in discussion of sexual orientation

social constructionist view of sexuality:

- → sexual desires & self-interpretation & self-identification
  - determined by sexuality concepts on interpersonal and intrapersonal levels

two considerations drawn from recent sociological research in sexuality

- a need for a concept of sexuality that explains
  - **metaphysical sense:** changes in one's sexuality that result from a re-interpretation of desire
  - **ethical sense:** inclusion of people in one's dating pool whose genders are incongruous with one's self-identified sexuality due to a cissexist and/or biologically essentialist view of gender

social & political dimensions require a target concept of sexual orientation that tracks only gender, and not biological sex characteristics

CLAIMS

interpretations of our desires can be right or wrong in ethical & metaphysical sense ← nature of the concepts

→ restrict a target concept of sexual orientation to only tracking gender

metaphysics of sexuality with three 'layers': mental state of desire, interpretations of desires, + socially conferred properties that come from group perception and recognition

Daniel Shussett: Re-Examining Body Politic and Group Agency for 21st Century Political Concerns

global body politic that can respond to the challenge of climate change

Latour's framework can be fruitfully combined with group agency and body politic theories to highlight the need for political action to form a group, something that is a duty for each potential member

- parallels in Group agency theories:
    - Gilbertian joint commitment (= Latour's call to include Earth as a political actor)
    - Pettit's characterization of group agents as being made, not born
    - Collins: individual duties to create a group agent

- Latour's hope to include Earth as a political actor may clash with the other traditions' reliance upon rationality

- Collins allows for the "transformation" of a group in order to increase its "responsiveness."

Anna Moltchanova: Institutional status roles and implicit bias

effects of implicit bias on institutional functioning challenge the view of institutions as networks of status roles

- recent studies show that implicit bias can prevent minority members' actions from being collectively accepted

- match collectively accepted conditional intentions → but due to lacking group's collective acceptance the meaning of their performance are taken as not (fully) fitting the collectively accepted institutional plan.

Problems with joint intentional action:

- **minority actors frequently cannot share a plan at the time of acting with the rest of the group because**

  1. their status role performance is constructed, via collective acceptance by the rest of the group, as not corresponding to the description given in the shared plan, and/or

  2. they are possibly playing by different rules, and/or

  3. they are not properly accepted as group members. These systemic occurrences affecting minorities make we-intentions in group actions hard to realize.

Alexander Dietz
Pattern-Based Reasons and Disaster

Pattern-based reasons:=
reasons for action deriving not from the features of our own actions, but from the features of the larger patterns of action in which we might be participating

- might relate to the patterns of action that will actually be carried out

- might relate to merely hypothetical patterns

PROBLEM:

- hypothetical & actually pattern-based reasons + with account of how to weigh these reasons → disastrous consequences

SOLUTION:

avoid this problem by adopting a different account of the weight of pattern-based reasons

Franziska Paulmann: NGOs as moral agents: Opportunities and challenges of collective agency approaches to problems of global ethics – The case of rescue duties towards refugees

preconditions for collective moral agency

- → practical deficits: addressed agents are unwilling or unable to sufficiently address these problems

- collectively addressed→ possible influence & moral role of individuals move into the focus of global ethics

- distribution of prospective duties by means of an agent-sensitive approach to collective moral action (→ *List and Pettit, Lawford Smith, French, Collins*)

agency of NGOs & individual duties to support or participate in them

- theoretical examination of collective agency to clarify the normative role of individuals in the global challenges

NGOs = intermediary agency (between collective agents and loose groups)

- autonomous agents "in their own rights"(List/Pettit 2011, 14) with clear decision-making-structures / can recognize moral reasons

- BUT particularly dependent on individuals (membership & financial support) for, NGOs.

Are forms of individual support are voluntary or rather morally obligatory?
How these different influences affect the ontological status of NGOs as moral agents in their own rights?

Find here the replay when the conference is over

Tuomas Vesterinen: Identifying the Explanatory Domain of the Looping Effect: Congruent and Incongruent Feedback Mechanisms of Interactive Kinds.

keynote

Francesco Franda
Causality, Convention, and Natural Kinds

EXCLUDING SOCIAL KINDS FROM BEING NATURAL KINDS ?

Khalidi's account of natural kinds grounded in causal properties & relations

- homeostatic mechanism are not a necessary feature / causally related → natural kinds / conventionally related → no natural kinds

BUT conventionally related can be natural kinds, since they can fulfill the epistemic role that natural kinds play

If conventional social kinds = natural kinds

THEN Khalidi's causal account seems inadequate

THEN Essentialism would not help either

BEST ACCOUNT: Matthew Slater, the Stable Property Cluster (SPC) account

- shifts focus from ontological ground for induction

- anti-realist and pragmatic account focuses on the stability of the kind rather than on what causes this stability

→ flexibility of the SPC account allows us to include as natural kinds the conventional categories investigated by the social sciences

Thomas J. Spiegel: The Individualist Bias

Individualist Prejudice

- taken as a self-evidential, hardly to be questioned (Baier 1997, Schmid 2005, Schweikard 2011, Stoutland (1997)→ (ontological) individualism is the received opinion

Individualist Implication

- tacitly transport metaphysical presuppositions

- entirely determined in virtue of their intrinsic properties

prejudice & implication → individualist bias in social ontology

foundational concepts have to be neutral and unbiased

individualist prejudice

→ predetermines space of possible conceptualization
→ concept of the individual as a foundational concept →"unearned" intuitive
   credence to individualism
→ metaphysical "ground" of the social world consists of individuals solely
   determined by intrinsic properties → individualism automatically becomes the
   more plausible default position

non-individualist theory → additional burden of proof
why a theory of the social world would need any
substantial over and above individuals

Gloria Sansò: The Weak Textualist Dilemma

Maurizio Ferraris (2009) "there is nothing social outside the text",

- formal institutions requiring some sort of document

- relies more on objects than on subjects → innovative realist approach to the social world

- social object created within a system of laws → its existence and nature do not depend on people's beliefs about that object, but on a document → **reality is what is written.**

discrepancies that may occur between documents and other documents, and between documents and things in reality.

1. "Jane" changing her identity → according to the new documents, her name is "Carol."
   - documents: two people, Jane & Carol; reality: just one person

2. according document 'Charter of the UN': governments have rights and obligations / according reality: rights and obligations are possessed and exercised by the government representatives

→ difficult to conciliate textualism and realism.

i) form of anti-realism (Jane & Carol do not both exist in reality)
ii) providing an ontology including redundant properties (veto power is possessed by the governments & by the government representatives)

SOLUTION: understand when we should consider documents and when we should not.

Kevin Richardson: Against Gender Definitions

essentialist definitions of gender fail to capture the heterogeneity of the class of women

→ social constructionists propose new definitions of gender

→ more inclusive and do no suffer the flaws of historical definition

BUT

GENDERS DO NOT HAVE DEFINITIONS

genders are metaphysically open

- future grounding facts (with respect to gender) are metaphysically indeterminate until they are settled by us.

If facts about genders are indeterminate

→ no definitions of genders

This result calls for a radical rethinking of the metaphysics of gender.

Thu 16

1. Emma Moormann: An Analysis of Collective Responsibility in the Social Anarchist Discussion on 'The Platform'
2. Åsa Burman: Social power
3. Tobias Störzinger: Socio-technical practices as constituents of implicit collective attitudes
4. Francesca Forle': Rythmòs in Joint Actions. Between Rhythmic Coordination and Emotional Attunement
5. Antoine Taillard: Two Types of Social Properties: A defense of Ontological Individualism
6. Daniela Tolchinsky: Cultural Group Agency
7. Vojtěch Zachník: Rules and institutions: Inferentialists' contribution to Social Ontology
8. Willem Church: The Social Ontology of Extractive Industries: A Critical Consideration of Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory and its Applications to Social Anthropology
9. Jenni Rytilä: Social construction of mathematical reality – Examining Julian Cole's institutional account
10. Barbora Siposova: Common knowledge that help is needed increases helping behavior in children
11. Peter Koch: Wellbeing, Capabilities, and Collectives
12. KEYNOTE: Achille Varzi: Derivatus Paradoxus.
13. Constant Bonard & Benjamin Neeser: The Incantatives
14. Donnchadh O Conaill: Putting our minds together: on Roeloefs' Combining Minds
15. Marco di Feo: Social Ontology of Collective Subjects. Social Ontological Foundation.

Emma Moormann: An Analysis of Collective Responsibility in the Social Anarchist Discussion on 'The Platform'

case study: applicability of contemporary work on collective responsibility to political theory

- debate between -'platformists' (Dielo Truda group) & opposed anarchist (Errico Malatesta)
  - platformists: contra individual responsibility pro collective responsibility: "each of its members is answerable for the revolutionary and political activity of the union as a whole"
  - anti-platformist: normative individualism

CLAIM:

CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY ON SOCIAL ANARCHIST GROUNDS IS UNTENABLE

SOLUTION

forward-looking collective responsibility (FLCR)

- compatible with social anarchism (anti-hierarchical & anti-oppressive approach towards maximizing individual autonomy)
- not premised on an antagonistic relation between the individual and the collective → nuanced, dynamic understanding of this relation

Åsa Burman: Social power

key concepts in social ontology:

institutional fact & deontic power

CLAIM

- deontic power is too narrow to capture a central dimension of the social world exemplified by certain aspects of gender & class

SOLUTION

→ new concept: **telic power** (another category of power)

1. captures a neglected central dimension of the social world

2. theoretically useful: telic power can both conflict with and reinforce deontic powers

GENERAL DEFINITION OF SOCIAL POWER CAPTURING BOTH DEONTIC POWER AND TELIC POWER

Tobias Störzinger: Socio-technical practices as constituents of implicit collective attitudes

Different constituents of collective attitudes

- joint commitments (Gilbert 1989) / collective acceptances (Tuomela 2013) / supervene on an aggregation of individual attitudes (List&Pettit 2011)

ALL: TAKE EXPLICIT INTENTIONAL ATTITUDES AS CENTRAL

→ ignoring cases of implicit collective attitudes (collective (dispositional) biases)

SOLUTION: theory of implicit collective attitudes

- constituted by a system of intertwined socio-technical practices

- implicit attitudes are not aggregated judgments, joint commitments or collective acceptances

- conceptualize → using some basic tools form so-called "practice-theory"

- overall systematic dispositions of a collective are generated by the structured ways of how individuals interact with each other

Social practices

- structure the way individuals interact within collectives

- constitute the overall systemic dispositions → implicit collective attitudes

day 4

Francesca Forle': Rythmòs in Joint Actions. Between Rhythmic Coordination and Emotional Attunement

factors facilitating joint actions (Tollefsen 2005, Michael and Pacherie 2015, Sebanz at al. 2005, Vesper et al. 2010).

high-level:
joint commitments or shared intentions (Gilbert, Bratman)

possible simpler: avoiding common knowledge of interconnected structures of intentions (Michael)

SHARED EMOTIONS → facilitating coordination and boosting the sense of belonging to the group (Michael 2011, Candiotto 2017, Szanto and Krueger 2019)

- create a common affective environment

- affect individuals, to share affective climate and develop a sense of group identification

condition of possibility of shared emotions: rythmòs alignment strengthen

- rapport between co-agents and the sense of belonging to the group, → a sense of agentive identity of group-members
- before the actual sharing of corresponding emotions

RYTHMÒS ALIGNMENT IS NOT EMOTIONAL SHARING BUT CAN ACT AS A TRIGGERING FACTOR FOR IT, WHILE ALSO ACTING PER SE AS A FACILITATOR FOR COORDINATION AND JOINT ACTIONS.

Antoine Taillard: Two Types of Social Properties: A defense of Ontological Individualism

1. **Ontological Individualism (OI)**
   Social properties globally supervene on individualistic properties.

2. **The Environmental Objection to OI**
   Non-individualistic properties of the individuals' surroundings are in the supervenience basis.

3. **R-properties to the rescue**
   The Environmental Objection goes through only if social properties are understood as *worldly*. But OI is really about social properties understood as *representational*.

Why R-OI?

R-OI. R-properties globally supervene on individualistic properties.

- W-properties alone cannot be detected by the social sciences.
- W-properties are causally and ontologically redundant.

→ The environment *does* determine the social.
→ The determination is not direct, but is mediated by the individuals' thoughts and behavior.

Daniela Tolchinsky: Cultural Group Agency

CULTURAL GROUPS AS GROUP AGENTS

→ offer a moral framework different than that created by transitional justice

- enable cultural groups could actively pursue desired political ends
- liberal transitional justice: create moral consensus about the past
- IF cultural groups desire to pursue the option of further justice → fundamental break in the moral logic of transition is necessary

reconceptualization of cultural groups

cultural group agents:

- cognitive states & narrative are generated through intersubjective processes
- experience irreducible group-based reasons for acting
- see group's actions as an extension of the members' own agency

Vojtěch Zachník: Rules and institutions: Inferentialists' contribution to Social Ontology

NOVEL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RULES

- How to behave…. disobedient behavior

→ Sellersian model → current approaches to social institutions

human social behavior

- based on various kinds of normative attitudes

- may carry out different behavioral responses

- structure social interactions in nonidentical ways (norm breaching, evasion, etc.).

PHENOMENON	OA	O,X	EFFECTIVE FACTOR
NORM FOLLOWING	Yes	Yes	
NORM OPPOSING	No	No	
NORM CONFORMING	No	Yes	Sanctions
UNPOPULAR NORMS	No	Yes	Higher power
PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE	No	Yes	Epistemic error
NORM EVASION	Yes	No	Asymmetric information
CONFLICTING INFORMATION	Yes	No	Social expectation

Willem Church: The Social Ontology of Extractive Industries. A Critical Consideration of Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory and its Applications to Social Anthropology

CENTRAL PROBLEMS FOR SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY: NATURE OF SOCIAL ENTITIES
(corporate kinship groups, governments, corporations, legally incorporated ethnic groups)

ethnographies "performative theories of social ontology"
* inspired by Bruno Latour's actor-network theory

- postulating social entities come into being, exist, act through the individual performances of agents (Golub 2014, Welker 2014)

CRITIC

- concrete examples: ethnographic fieldwork on customary landholding groups around a mine in Papua New Guinea

1. overly generic means for which different social categories
→ fails to make clear distinctions between the ontological efficacy of different actions— e.g. claimant declaring to be customary landowners versus land court judge making it so
2. no distinction between causally constraining objects (like speed-bumps) with ontologically determining entities (like legal statues)
→ flawed understandings of the landowner associations: kinds of social entities anthropologists are interested more broadly

Jenni Rytilä
Social construction of mathematical reality – Examining Julian Cole's institutional account

mathematical social constructivism: mathematical entities = social constructs constituted by social practices

- Julian C. Cole's (2009, 2015) theory of social construction of mathematical reality

- → a product of our collectively imposing function onto reality, where the functions in question are surrogacy or representational functions

MERIT: agrees with relevant aspects of actual mathematical practice and fits into a more general ontology.

CHALLENGES:

differences between mathematical entities & other entities of social reality

- → objectivity of mathematics - non-contingency

- → way of being connected to the features of the physical world

TO DO: explaining how mathematics can be both objective and applicable in describing physical reality

Barbora Siposova
Common knowledge that help is needed increases helping behavior in children

- sometimes we help solely out of a sense of obligation to the person in need
  →common knowledge between the helper & the helpee that the helpee needs help

- test whether children's helping behavior is affected by having common knowledge with the recipient about the recipient's need, 6-year-olds faced a dilemma: either collect stickers or help an experimenter

private knowledge about it (they heard it individually)

common knowledge about the experimenter's plight (because they heard it together)

RESULT

- more likely to help when they and the experimenter had common knowledge about the experimenter's plight

- already in young children common knowledge can heighten the sense of obligation to help others in need.

Peter Koch: Wellbeing, Capabilities, and Collectives

FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE WELLBEING OF COLLECTIVE ENTITIES

central: realizations of capabilities

- Capabilities Approach (Amartya Sen / Martha Nussbaum)

  →Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)

- capabilities = subclass of BFO-disposition

→ a special **disposition** - realization is in the interest of the bearer

- gain or loss of a capability necessarily corresponds to a change in its bearer

- A collective entity has capabilities in virtue of the dispositions of its constituent parts; however, no individual constituent or part is the bearer of the capability.

- wellbeing of a collective entity

  - grounded in the realization and development of its capabilities

  - realizations of its capabilities depend on the interaction between the collective entity and its environment

  - loss or gain of the collective's capabilities corresponds to a change in one or more constituents of the collective

major problems lay in clarifying the role of the context

Achille Varzi: Derivatus Paradoxus.

The Platypus is a cute animal, but not much depends on it; derivatives are conquering the world, creating financial crises and a great many disasters besides.

We better figure out what they are, or we are going to be in trouble.

The actual value **V** of goods **G** at date **D** will be determined by the market, but the price **P** that **Y** will pay to **X** is fixed in advance and only on the basis of the joint forecast of **X** and **Y** (plus storage costs, insurance costs, etc.).

Constant Bonard & Benjamin Neeser: The Incantatives

speech acts contribute to the construction of social reality

- contemporary philosophers have focused on exercitives/declarations

NEW kind of speech act

THE INCANTATIVES

= express and generate collective evaluations

slogans etc.

BLACK LIVES MATTER

Donnchadh O Conaill: Putting our minds together: on Roeloefs' Combining Minds

- Luke Roelofs: Combinationalism - how a conscious experiences of a subject can be composed of the experiences of distinct subjects which make it up

two objections

1. questions some of the general metaphysical claims Roelofs has not provided a robust defence of Experience Inheritance

2. problematic idea of phenomenal unity

C is composite subject, composed of distinct subjects A and B; A has token experience $E1$, B has $E2$, C has $E3$

Marco di Feo: Social Ontology of Collective Subjects. Social Ontological Foundation

Husserl's theory of parts & wholes

"dense wholes": consist of non-independent parts
second species wholes: independent parts

→ **collective subjects = "second species wholes"**

- real collectives: composed of members interacting
  → two kinds of interconnected bonds
  - horizontal bond between the parts
  - vertical bond between the parts and the whole

→ individuals become collective members and ontologically found the collective itself

- characteristics of the social bonds between collective's members:
  - (i) delocalized membership
  - (ii) diachronic interdependence

→ Since both delocalized membership and diachronic interdependence characterize only social bonds between relatively non-independent parts, then collective subjects must be considered second species wholes.

Fri 16

1. Yuki Nishimoto: Analysis of Collective Intentionality from the Linguistic Pragmatism View

2. Bill Wringe: Things We Can Get Excited About: Shared Emotions and Other Minds

3. Haixin Dang: Collective Epistemic Responsibility and Scientific Collaboration

4. Matthew Rachar: Collective Action as Involvement

5. SYMPOSIUM: Norms and commitments in human-robot cooperative interactions
Elisabeth Pacherie: "Introduction – Motivational and predictive challenges in human-robot cooperative interactions"

6. Ingar Brinck: "Social norms in Human-Robot interaction"

7. Raul Hakli: "Cooperative interactions with social robots?"

8. John Michael:"The Sense of Commitment in Human-Robot Interaction"

9. KEYNOTE: Jonathan Schaffer: No Money, No Women: Social Constructionism Entails Relationalism

10. Francesca Bonalumi: Should I stay or should I go? Three-year-olds' sensitivity to appropriate motives to break a commitment

11. Richard Rowland: Normativity and Gender Identity

12. *Ron Mallon: Beyond Adaptive Preferences: A Different Model of "Hard Cases" for Feminism*

13. *Karl Egerton: Metaontological impasse in social ontology – how do we move forward?*

Yuki Nishimoto: Analysis of Collective Intentionality from the Linguistic Pragmatism View

how to understand "joint action"

- Gilbert (2014): individual's intention to do her part in joint action is essentially involves normative constraints, "joint commitment".

- Bratman (2014):individual's intention to do her part in joint action do not involves normativity

- inferentialism (Brandom): individual's intention to do her part in joint action will also be analyzed as the normative status (contra representationism)

- de González de Prado & Zamora-Bonilla (2015) analyze groups as a player of games and discusses the view that groups have an intention,

HERE

- apply inferentialism to analyze the intention of group members. That is, I will consider the individual's intention to do his or her part in joint action in terms of speech acts such as "we intend".

- difference between "I intend" and "we intend" in the perspective of functions in language practice.

- intention of group members cannot be explained without normative nature

Bill Wringe: Things We Can Get Excited About: Shared Emotions and Other Minds

epistemological problem about knowledge of other people's mental states

Can we see that someone is in a certain kind of mental state ?

perceiving emotional states ? - not enough!

- seeing that someone is in a particular kind of mental state
   → seeing that they are in an intentional state + being directed at a wide variety of different kinds of objects (including non-existent ones)

perception + knowledge of our own mental states

- our own emotions are intentional states

- But how could knowledge of our own mental states provide us with a response to skeptical worries about other people's mental states?

KNOWLEDGE OF SHARED MENTAL STATES CAN BE DIRECT

Haixin Dang: Collective Epistemic Responsibility and Scientific Collaboration

To what extent a group of authors can be epistemically responsible for something?

- reject a **group agent account**
  (1) unclear how a group agent is formed in science
  (2) incentive structure of science does not work
  - →empirical work: collaborations in science depend on a lot of individual negotiation
  - sense of individual responsibility necessary to know which individual scientists to invite into collaborations

- reject the **"no one is responsible" view**
  - untenable view for thinking about how collaborations function

- **alternative account**
  - every collaborator will be responsible but be responsible in different senses

Matthew Rachar: Collective Action as Involvement

collective actions & interpersonal obligations →
What is the content of these obligations and what they are grounded in?

- inform others ← expectations & informational interests
- do one's part ← relation between the participatory intentions of the co-actors
- receive the concurrence of the other parties before leaving ← jointness of the commitment made by participants

- grounded in normative interests → deontic interest

  deontic interest = being able to bind ourselves together

- ground obligations in collective action

- mutual cognitive and social recognition
  - key signal of the existence of certain kinds of involvement
  - required for collective intention

Collective intention
- guiding our behaviour towards a shared goal + trigger a special kind of social relationship

→ connection between serving our non-normative interests in social coordination and creating rich interpersonal relationships that serve our normative interests.

Norms and commitments in human-robot cooperative interactions

Convenor. Elisabeth Pacherie (Institut Jean Nicod, PSL, Paris).

Speakers & talks

- Elisabeth Pacherie (Institut Jean Nicod, PSL, Paris): "Introduction Motivational and predictive challenges in human-robot cooperat interactions"

- Ingar Brinck (Lund University): "Social norms in Human-Robot interaction"

- Raul Hakli (University of Helsinki): "Cooperative interactions with social robots?"

- John Michael (Central European University, Vienna): "The Sense of Commitment in Human-Robot Interaction"

Social Robotics

- Recent years have seen the fast expansion of the field of social robotics.
- Important efforts and abundant resources have been dedicated to the design and manufacture of robots for use in numerous social contexts, such as companionship to the elderly, education, therapy or service.

Predictive challenges

- Successful cooperative interactions are also premised on prediction. Agents need to coordinate their actions at various levels and to do must be able to make accurate predictions regarding their partner's actions and their consequences.
- In human-human interactions a variety of processes and devices, ranging from automatic processes of motor resonance all the way to explicit communication and commitments, help us predict the actions of our partners.
- However, research on human-robot interaction suggests that prediction can be a serious challenge for human-robot interactions. Robots are often cognitively opaque to their human partners. For instance, findings in psychology and neuroscience suggest that humans interact differently and do not deploy the same range of predictive processes when their partner is a robot rather than a human (Sahaï et al., 2017; 2019).
- In addition, the gap between the expected and the actual capabilities of the robot may also impact the predictive capacities of humans.

Human-Robot vs. Human-Human Interaction

- To make further progress, research in human robot interaction (HRI) has explored various avenues approaches towards making robots more capable of interacting meaningfully with humans.
- In this effort, HRI research has taken inspiration from some important findings in psychology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience regarding human-human interaction (HHI)
- However, this enterprise confronts many challenges.

Motivational Challenges

- Humans are social animals that exhibit a robust motivation to engage with others.
- This motivation that has a variety of sources, both endogenous (e.g. need to belong or general pro-social tendency) or exogenous (e.g. social pressure).
- It plays a crucial role in explaining why people engage in joint action with human partners and why they may remain engaged in a joint action even when more attractive options emerge.
- In contrast, humans appear much less motivated to engage in joint actions with robots, exhibiting negative attitudes (e.g., the *Uncanny Valley Effect*) and forms of distrust toward robots (e.g., Sanders et al., 2016).

Two main current approaches

- **Behavioral strategies** emphasize the need to built robots whose appearance and behavior appeal to human positive emotions and exploit human tendencies towards anthropomorphism.
- **Cognitive strategies** attempt to identify and characterize the fundamental social capacities deployed in human-human interactions in order to design robots with similar capacities for understanding the behavior or mental states of their human partners.
- These cognitive strategies are exemplified by the work of several laboratories that attempt to design robots with social capacities such as joint attention (e.g. Huang and Thomaz 2011), perception of gestures and gaze direction (e.g. Aryananda 2009; Pateraki et al 2009) or theory of mind (e.g., Breazeal et al. 2009; Pandey and Alami 2010).

Concern with these approaches

- **Behavioral strategies**:
  - **Shallowness**: equipping a robot with, say, a capacity for bodily and facial expressions of emotions may appeal to humans and go some way toward alleviating the motivational challenge, but insofar as these emotional expressions do not reflect actual emotional understanding, this positive impression may be short-lived and predictive challenges made more acute.
  - **Ethical concerns**: It can be argued that the way in which these robots engage with humans is unethical, as it exploits human emotional openness and vulnerability simply to improve the technical quality of interaction. This violates users' integrity and creates the risk who become emotionally dependent on such robots be hurt, suffer depression, and develop mental and physical illnesses (Brinck & Balkenius, 2018).
- Cognitive strategies:
  - **Computational costs**: so far attempts at endowing robots with social cognitive capacities have operated in piecemeal fashion, but the computational costs involved in building all these capacities in a single robot would be extremely high, making the prospect possibly unrealistic.
  - **Ethical concerns**: assuming this could be achieved, how should we treat these robots? Should they be treated as social agents worthy of moral consideration?

Norms and commitments

- The purpose of this symposium is to assess the merits of a third type of approach that emphasizes the importance of norms and commitments in cooperative interactions.
- To what extent can an appeal to norms and commitments in shaping human-robot cooperative interactions help mitigate motivational and predictive challenges?
- What could be the benefits or drawbacks of such an approach compared to other strategies?
- Speakers:
  - Raul Hakli (University of Helsinki): *Cooperative interactions with social robots?*
  - Ingar Brinck (Lund University): *Social norms in Human-Robot interaction*
  - John Michael (Central European University, Vienna):*The Sense of Commitment in Human-Robot Interaction*

Raul Hakli: Trusting a robot collaborator

- collaboration requires that the collaborators can trust each other → human-robot collaboration?

- proper trust requires → more than mere reliance, some kind of a normative expectation

    normative component in terms of motivations, commitments, or obligations

- psychologically possible to trust robots

- BUT not fully appropriate BECAUSE normative expectations do not seem to be applicable to robots

- we rely on them to work as expected but we also have certain beliefs about the design, implementation, and use of those robots → normative component of trust is ultimately applied to people instead of the robots themselves

This affects the moral or normative status of robots

- Robots cannot bear moral responsibility
- Robots are not persons, or moral agents with rights and obligations
- Robots are not proper subjects of social commitments (arguably)
- Robots are not proper objects of trust (arguably, see Hawley 2014)
- Robots are not properly subject to norms (arguably)
- Robots cannot be proper participants in joint actions (at least under Gilbertian views)
- Hence, robots lack several important capacities involved in proper social interaction, and hence it seems that robots are not proper "social agents" either.

Behaviour suggesting a social stance

- Sensitivity to agency: recognizing agents from non-agents, adjusting behaviour based on others' responses
- Tendency for interaction: not mere manipulation of others but seeking contact, attempt to communicate own intentions, perhaps even engagement in joint activities
- Sensitivity to conventions, social norms and roles

John Michael: The Sense of Commitment in Human-Robot Interaction

- set of studies to probe various means of boosting people's sense of commitment to robot interaction partners
  - manipulating and measuring people's sense of commitment to robot interaction partners

- implications for our psychological and normative understanding of commitment

Playing Snake with iCub

Significant difference between high (M= 83.39, logtransformed M= 1.849, SD=0.276) and low (M= 73.56 logtransformed M= 1.800, SD=0.263) effort conditions, $F(25) = 2.80, p = .010, d = .550$

The perception of a robot partner's effort elicits a sense of commitment to human-robot interaction

Marcell Székely, Henry Powell, Fabio Vannucci, Francesco Rea, Alessandra Sciutti and John Michael
Central European University; University of Warwick
Università di Geneva and Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia
Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia

Median persistence as a function of the partner's effort

Social Norms in HRI?

Bicchieri (2011) :
'...informal rules that govern behavior in groups and societies...'... A set of norms: 'specifies what is acceptable and what is not in a society or group'

Bicchieri (2006):
(a) *Empirical expectations:* individuals believe that a sufficiently large subset of the relevant group/population conforms to the norm in situations of type S, and either:
(b) *Normative expectations:* individuals believe that a sufficiently large subset of the relevant group/population expects them to conform to the norm in situations of type S; or
(b') *Normative expectations with sanctions:* individuals believe that a sufficiently large subset of the relevant group/population expects them to conform to the norm in situations of type S, prefers them to conform and may sanction behavior.

Ingar Brinck: Social norms in Human-Robot interaction

Social norms:=

- spontaneously emergent patterns of coordinated behaviour

- organize how individuals behave towards each other in accordance with social expectations about what and how an individual ought to do in a given situation

- improve how agents collectively manage

- reduce the cognitive costs associated with interaction generally

→ **approach to HRI based in social norms**

BUT social norms present a challenge for HRI, being notoriously difficult to implement

KEYNOTE

Jonathan Schaffer: No Money, No Women: Social Constructionism Entails Relationalism

LISTEN TO THE TALK ON THE WEBSITE

Brian Epstein: Ontological explanation without reduction: Exploring the real definition of social kinds

understanding "what is X" questions

- "real definition" & explore interactions between notions *(essence, grounding, identity, metaphysical explanation)* → quite general and top-down: explore metaphysical notions directly & use cases to illustrate and refine theories

  different approach: specific case in all its detail

- informative → complexity of a real case introduces new wrinkles and desiderata

case: metaphysics of social groups.: "What are social groups"

- often reducing social groups to some other kind of entity

- choosing between identifying social groups with one of those kinds and leaving them mysteriou, → incorrect

- identification probably not successful

→ construct a full metaphysical explanation of the nature and metaphysical sources of social groups. The details of that explanation then help bring out characteristics that accounts of "what is X"

Francesca Bonalumi: Should I stay or should I go? Three-year-olds' sensitivity to appropriate motives to break a commitment

Commitments → obligations - precise scope of commitments?

3-year-olds understand obligations entailed by joint commitments

- distinguish between instances in which a partner fails to make a contribution intentionally or for other reasons

Can they assess the legitimacy of motives leading agents to intentionally dissolve commitments?

- manipulated motives that lead a partner to break a commitment
  3-year-olds played a game together - suddenly this joint activity was interrupted either because (a) the partner was lured away to play another tempting game; or (b) she assisted another agent in distress

→ children more likely to manifest signs of protest when the partner was lured away by another temping game

→ BUT when forced to make a binary choice between granting or denying release, children did not manifest significantly different responses

3-year-old children appropriately evaluate the reasons, but their evaluation still does not translate into a stable attitude towards the partner, suggesting that this capacity is not yet fully developed

Richard Rowland:
Normativity and Gender Identity

account of gender identity should

i.   provide a clear explanation of what gender identity is that can be used to help explain gender identity to those who do not yet understand it,

ii. show that gender identity is important and merits respect

iii. serve the purposes of trans rights movements.

Katherine Jenkins' norm relevancy account of gender identity

for A to have the gender identity G is for A to experience the norms that are associated with G in her social context as relevant to her

BUT without an account of experiences of norm relevancy this account cannot do (i-iii).

→ accept account of experiences of norm relevancy in terms of judgments and intuitions about non-instrumental normative reasons

Sat 18

1. Rachel K. Cooper: Social Kinds and Social Groups

2. Tully Rector: The Ontological Foundation of Corporate Power

3. *Antoine Vuille: Ways of Phi-ing and Social Groups*

4. Khang Ton: Ethnicity: What is It? What Do We Want It To Be?

5. Philippe De Brabanter & Bruno Leclercq: Empirical investigation of indexical externalism about 'social-kind' terms

6. Saba Bazargan-Forward: What do the Innocent Beneficiaries of Wrongdoing Owe?

7. Jonas Faria Costa: The Sense of Joint Ownership: The difference between loose collaboration and strict cooperation

8. Franz Altner: A constitutive account of group agency

9. Dimitrios Zachos: Criminality in Collectives and Persona Moralis Composita

10. Laura Wildemann Kane: Fragile Alliances and Moral Harm: The Ontological Status of Internet Mobs

11. Asya Passinsky: An Essentialist Framework for Social Ontology

12. *Carlos Núñez: I intend that we J, but I don't intend to play my own part in our J-ing*

13. *Randall Westgren:Carl Menger's Economic Ontology: One Hundred Fifty Years On*

14. *Laura Nicoara: A Defense of Weak Essentialism about Gender Kinds*

15. *Guido Löhr: Normative and Non-normative commitments*

Rachel K. Cooper: Social Kinds and Social Groups

REENGINEERING TWO RELATED CONCEPTS: SOCIAL KIND & SOCIAL GROUP

social group:

- members jointly accept beliefs about individuals with a certain cluster of features *(acceptance explains some of the regularities observed among individuals with that cluster of features)*

social kind:

- members share a certain cluster of features
  (*some regularities are explained (in part) by jointly accepted beliefs about individuals with that cluster of features)*
  BUT social kinds are not instances of social groups

→ combatting oppression

- no underlying essence among members (whether natural or social)

- facilitate an understanding of how we unwittingly contribute to the appearance of an underlying essence among members of social kinds

- ameliorate our everyday concepts

Ethical Worries about Perceptual Individuation:
Passing / Identity / Intersectionality / Reification

Tully Rector: The Ontological Foundation of Corporate Power

MODERN BUSINESS CORPORATION = A POLITICAL AGENT

- capital &increasing authority over provision of public goods
→ influence conduct and decision-making of other social actors, including states
→ institutional environments hierarchically gover natural persons

normative questions concerning legitimacy, grounds, scope of corporate power

- political analysis of the corporate form's ontological anchoring

- corporations fuse power-to with power-over into a form of "noumenal power", or the capacity to shape and organize the space of reasons

Law and Economics literature:

- **contractual model**
obscures salient features of corporate agency's public ontological basis, (benefit of capital owners vis-a-vis other agents)

→ **concession theory**

Khang Ton: Ethnicity: What is It? What Do We Want It To Be?

ETHNICITY = A SOCIAL CATEGORY SEVERELY UNDER-THEORIZED IN PHILOSOPHY

- no consensus on how to define ethnicity in anthropology & sociology

- majority-minority dichotomy: only minority groups and not the dominant group are considered "ethnic"

- morally and politically defective (usage - racially biased & cultural → socially pernicious and harmful effects)

NEW→ 'Multidimensional Contextualism' (MC) about ethnicity

- one's ethnicity within a context is determined by a complex interplay between objective, external social factors as well as internal, subjective self-identification (shared history)

two important implications

- a person can have different ethnicities as they travel across various different contexts and social environments

- person's ethnicity and ethnic identity are fluid and negotiable

→ conceptual engineering:
(i) assessing the concept (ii) proposing an ameliorative strategy for improvement (iii) implementing the ameliorative proposal

Are there 'social kinds' the way that there are 'natural kinds'?

- Can determination of the meaning of terms denote social phenomena?

Saba Bazargan-Forward: What do the Innocent Beneficiaries of Wrongdoing Owe?

The Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP)

- beneficiaries of a wrongdoer's actions have a duty to compensate the victim by transferring non-generative benefits → because the beneficiary benefitted from the wrongdoer's actions

 intuition:

- benefits resulting from a wrong are 'tainted' → inculpates beneficiaries in the wrongdoing if they do not divest themselves of the benefit in a way remedying the collective wrong from which the benefit arose

 BENEFITING AS SUCH GROUNDS A DUTY

Jonas Faria Costa: The Sense of Joint Ownership: The difference between loose collaboration and strict cooperation

strong forms of cooperation: → rationality & normativity of

NEW feeling of joint ownership of the agency grounds

- entitlement to rebuke others for not cooperating

feeling of joint ownership versus joint commitment

- strict cooperation (with joint ownership)
- loose collaboration (without joint ownership)

→ difference between public spaces & open spaces

- Open spaces
    - do not involve a feeling of joint ownership, which diminishes the feeling of being jointly accountable (Internet forums)
    - public debate by political figures diminishes the feeling of joint ownership

Augie Faller: Are There Social Causes?

It seems that the social world matters causally. But, many accounts of what it is to be social cannot accommodate this observation.

→ "social causal powers": conferred by social features

- agency & moral responsibility require that groups cause things to happen in a way that doesn't reduce to the causal powers of the people that make up the group

- **Structuralism**
  → threat to the reality of social causal powers social properties in terms of social relations

- properties that reduce to extrinsic features of a thing cannot confer genuine causal powers (e.g., Jaegwon Kim, Derk Pereboom)

Problem: But what about social objects that do seem to be constituted by a material object?
Solution: These social objects are partly constituted by the material stuff and partly constituted by the states of affairs they are involved in.

Franz Altner: A constitutive account of group agency

functionalist theories of group agency fail to distinguish between group activity & intentional actions of group agents

→ problematic consequences for theories of collective responsibility that focus on the quality of the will as the locus of appropriate attributions of blame and praise

CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF GROUP AGENCY

- David Velleman: individual to act intentionally ← self-understanding

→ taking groups to aim at self-understanding (- social structures & mechanisms correspond to self-understanding)

- → distinguish mere activity and autonomous intentional group action

- self-understanding:

Why a group might care for self-understanding in the first place.

- self-understanding → constitutive of autonomous intentional action

GROUP ACTIVITIES: behaviors of groups for which we cannot attribute the aim of self-understanding to the group
INTENTIONAL ACTIONS: actions by a group where we can attribute the aim of self-intelligibility to the group.

Dimitrios Zachos: Criminality in Collectives and Persona Moralis Composita

individual criminality versus collective criminality

- liberal aspect of criminal law – in dubio pro reo

discussing several cases

- someone in prison was blamed guilty for something happen while he was in prison

- 2 people have car race - one is causing a car accident with letal consequences - both conviction of murder

Laura Wildemann Kane: Fragile Alliances and Moral Harm: The Ontological Status of Internet Mobs

case: agent loses their job because of an offensive Tweet.

- internet mob assume membership in a moral community
  → justify participation in internet mob accountability practices
  → use shaming tactics to "bring the transgressor to account"

serial collective:

  - not a group (not a community)
    certain level of social existence & relations with others based upon actions directed toward particular ends

  - can be externally constructed

  - can also be purposefully constructed by individuals

    internet mobs form ephemeral serial collectives

  - organized around producing one particular outcome (i.e. the termination of employment of an online moral transgressor)

- morally problematic

  - social media users ought to engage in dialog and reason-exchange with one another, including moral transgressors, to bring about more restorative outcomes for victims and transgressors

Asya Passinsky: An Essentialist Framework for Social Ontology

Brian Epstein: social ontology is concerned with how the social world is built - grounding or anchoring

social ontology is also concerned with the essence of the social world

- debate within social ontology over the nature of money,
  - not adequately represented as a debate about grounding or anchoring
- debate within social ontology over the nature of social groups
  - not adequately represented as a debate about grounding or anchoring

→ sketching an essentialist framework for social ontology

Mon 20

1. Glenda Satne: Intentional Action: from the 'I' to the 'We'.
2. Matt Dean: Social Groups and Meaning in Life
3. Francesca De Vecchi: Varieties of Collectives Types, Value Ranks and Social Unity – Issues of Qualitative Social Ontology
4. Björn Petersson: Over-determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities
5. Giulia Lasagni: Structuralism about Group Agency
6. Noriaki Okamoto: An Ontological Analysis of Corporate Income: The Diversity of Markets and the Power of Collective Declaration
7. Beatrice Sasha Kobow: A Global Understanding of Fictions
8. Gloria Mähringer: Reasons as Socially Constructed Facts
9. Jaana Virta: Ásta's Social Categories + Butler's Gender Performativity = A Detailed Theory of (Performative) Gender?
10. Torsten Menge: Fictional Expectations and the Ontology of Power
11. Anna Strasser: Social norms regulating our interactions with artificial agents
12. Jesús Zamora-Bonilla: Towards an ontology of social problems.
13. Julian Davis: Shared Agency, Plural Intentions, and Institutions
14. Aaron Berman: Haslanger, Marx, and Marxist-Feminist Unitary Theory

Glenda Satne: Intentional Action: from the 'I' to the 'We'

Anscombe (1956): core characteristic of intentional action → self-knowledge

- → plural or collective self-knowledge (Laurence 2011, Schmid 2014, 2016, Rödl 2015, 2018) → 'the first person plural'
    - not clear how to extend from face-to-face interactions to cases in which the collectives are largely spread in time and space

two alternative methodological solutions to this problem:

- **reductionist solution:** sufficient and/or necessary conditions for an action to be collectively intentional (e.g. Bratman 1992, Rödl 2015)
- **pluralist proposal:** allowing for differences in the core characteristics of collective intentional activities (e.g. Schmid 2014, Zahavi 2018)

paradigmatic account:

- distinguishing a set of criteria
  →identify core & borderline cases of collective intentional action

- multi-dimensional matrix to classify different cases and analyze them according to the established criteria
    - remains neutral about which is the best way to characterize the intentional activities of collectives + offering a way to identify common features, opening the door for their conceptual and empirical enquiry

Matt Dean:
Social Groups and Meaning in Life

good life relates to happiness & morality
(be happy & to fulfill what one owes to other people)

+ meaningful activities → meaning contributes to well-being

- CLAIMS

1. meaning in life can be scaled from individuals up to social groups

2. Gilbert's notion of "joint commitment" helps make sense of the meaning of a group's life

3. The joint commitment account of the meaning of a group's life: The life of a social group is meaningful if and only if (1) its members are jointly committed to pursue as a body projects that are meaningful and (2) to some extent similar past projects have been successful.

Francesca De Vecchi: Varieties of Collectives Types, Value Ranks and Social Unity – Issues of Qualitative Social Ontology

Are the different types of collectives oriented toward different kinds of values ?

certain values unify & bind people together, others divide people and weaken collectives' social unity

- Gilbert: too generic / does not distinguish varieties of plural subjects

→ Scheler: qualitatively different types of collectives

- e.g. "social units": "masse", "life-community", "society" and "collective person"

- kinds of values

  - "vital values": psychophysical wellbeing & prosperity of individuals
  - "values of the sensibly agreeable": what is useful and brings about pleasure: subjects of inter-personal relations in an individualistic way
  - "values of personhood": beauty, culture & knowledge
  - "values of the holy": individuals are mutually responsible & interdependent in their personal flourishment

ONLY VALUES OF PERSONHOOD & HOLY ARE SHARABLE & UNIFY PEOPLE TOGETHER

- 'vital values' & 'values of the sensibly agreeable' cannot be shared:
  → divisive values, individuals have to compete with one another

  → less divisible values are, the more sharable they are

- sharable values intensify the social unity of those collectives' types that are grounded on them

Björn Petersson: Over-determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities

comparative counterfactual conception of harm (Parfit, Feit):

- plurality of events harms A **if and only** if that plurality is the smallest plurality of events such that, if none of them had occurred, A would have been better off

challenge:

- analysis of 'harm' rests on a mistake about the relevant counterfactual comparison
- pluralities make no difference to the worse for anyone in the over-determination cases → revising the comparative conception of harm

- → harmful, but abandoning the idea that making a difference to the worse for someone is essential to harming

CLAIM: we should hold on to the difference-making criterion and give up the plural harm principle

- why Parfit's and Feit's plural harm approach still seems attractive

Giulia Lasagni: Structuralism about Group Agency

social groups as agents

→ metaphysical structure Ritchie's structuralist ontology (2018)

structuralism can individuate agentive properties of different kinds

- Ritchie's view: social groups =realizations of social structures, made social by their constitutive dependence on social factors

- social factors can be either internal or external to a group

- agentive properties →intrinsic or extrinsic depending on whether the structure is based on internal or external social factors

- without relying on structuralist considerations (functionalist approach), difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties and taking both as essential is not possible

A structuralist account will then contribute to an improved understanding of group agency.

Noriaki Okamoto: An Ontological Analysis of Corporate Income: The Diversity of Markets and the Power of Collective Declaration

corporate profit → tremendous influences on individual & organizational behaviours (corporate performance & economy as a whole)

new concept of comprehensive income

- →income not a static but dynamic concept
  changes of the way corporate income is calculated reflect changes of the way we see market or market itself

- → perspective of performativity

various studies on the concept of performativity

- Brisset (2019) & Okamoto (2020): collective corporate profit performs collective attitudes in the markets

- Jackson (2019) & Dodd (2014): diversity of markets & relativity of how we perceive markets are highlighted

- political activity is significant in institutional building

- → Tuomela (2002): viewpoint of operative members

Beatrice Sasha Kobow:
A Global Understanding of Fictions

Fictions:

- heuristic tools

- false but useful

- agency guiding

- epistemic task: make us hear the call of our 'logical conscience' - logisches Gewissen!

Without them no higher moral life and no higher science would be possible (Hans Vaihinger).

read →

Gloria Mähringer: Reasons as Socially Constructed Facts

A SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF REASONS

Mercier & Sperber (2017)

- reasoning is intuitive inference from reasons, not strictly following logical requirements
- reasons are items that evolved as currency in a social justification practice
- → reflects a communicative social practice

- various positions in analytic philosophy
    - rationality: "responding to reasons" (Kiesewetter)
    - following structural requirements (Broome)
    - mind-independence (Scanlon, Skorups)
    - facts to which mind responds in the process of rational deliberation
    - facts that we can see as speaking in favor of particular actions (justificatory or explanatory purposes)

    HERE: reasons as socially (discursively) constructed facts

- → Haslanger:
element of constitutive social construction in normative practice &
element of causal social construction in the origin of our reasons

    defend mind-independence without defending normative reality as independent of human practice

Jaana Virta: Ásta's Social Categories + Butler's Gender Performativity = A Detailed Theory of (Performative) Gender?

balancing gendered actions in social interaction with expectations of others

Ásta:
how gender is conferred on a person in a concrete situation lasting a given duration

Butler:
gender is constructed via constant iteration of gender performatives → gender is something we do rather than something we possess or express

Ásta & Butler do NOT focus on specific genders & do not requires that a person's gender remains stable across contexts

- Butler's theory is at the same time too wide and too detailed

- Ásta's view doesn't offer tools for investigating "what kind of attitudes, states, or actions of the subject's matter" in the conferral in a given context

→ combine Ásta (conferral of social categories) with Butler (theory of gender performativity) = full account of performative gender

→ use Butler's theory as a method to study the details of the conferral context in Ásta's sense to investigate what's concretely going on in the conferral situation in terms of the concept of a gender performative

Torsten Menge: Fictional Expectations and the Ontology of Power

- What kind of thing is power and how does it fit into out our understanding of the social world?

 pragmatic character of power ascriptions

- involve fictional expectations (robust capacity to make a difference to the actions of others)

expectations → constitute social order built into material practices
→ constitute power → power itself has a fictional character

- **attitudes towards monetary value** → expect that it will retain its value in the future → idealized expectations → constitutive effect + fictional / do not to assess their truth or justification, but emphasize their pragmatic effect

- **power ascriptions**
  - → expectation of stability
  - not a literal transfer of personal strength
 - depends on the ongoing willingness of aligned agents

      idea of power as a stable & robust capacity
      → acting on this idea helps constitute social order

- reconcile consensual *(robust, stable feature)* & conflictual *(dynamic, social character)* accounts :

attend to the performative role that both kinds of characterizations play in creating and maintaining power

Anna Strasser: Social norms regulating our interactions with artificial agents

(1) Some human-machine-interactions cannot be reduced to tool-use and should rather be considered as a new type of social interactions.

- current conceptions of social interaction require too much from artificial systems → minimal approach to capture in-between cases – new types of social interactions

(2) consequences of potentially social interactions with artificial agents

- potential disastrous transfers can have an impact on human-human interactions

→ **certain behaviors towards artificial agents become a moral dimension**

- to prevent cruel misbehavior among humans it seems reasonable to regulate behavior in human-machine interactions before it can be transferred

This is why we should consider social norms regulating our interactions with artificial agents.

Jesús Zamora-Bonilla: Towards an ontology of social problems.

'social problems' – an important element of social ontology

- constitute in a sense the cornerstone of 'the social'

- most other 'social facts' may be basically understood as arising as an outcome of the responses that people try to give to social problems

- 'puts a question' to a group of people so that → conflicting 'answers'

→ 'the social' emerge as the outcome of the deliberation between contradictory responses

- → midway from 'substantialist' (Searle, Tuomela) and 'processualist' social ontologies (Livet & Nef, Epstein)

- **map of theoretical tools and their possible interactions,**

  - Latour's ontological concept of 'matters of concern'

  - Brandom's normative inferentialism

  - Meyer's 'problematology'

  - Hintikka's interrogative semantics.

  - social choice or public choice theory (from economics),

  - collective action theory or McPhail 'assemblig perspective' (from sociology)

Julian Davis: Shared Agency, Plural Intentions, and Institutions

prominent analytic approaches to institutional agency

- Shapiro (plan theoretic functionalism) / Guala & Hindriks (game theoretic unified social ontology)

→explain organized institutions &systematic institutions **without the need for collective attitudes (shared intentions)** among institutional participants

- not all institutional actions necessarily entail collective attitudes

BUT denying shared intentionality in institutional agency comes with exceptionable philosophical costs

→ model rule-governed institutional activity without an element of shared intentionality seems not possible

Aaron Berman: Haslanger, Marx, and Marxist-Feminist Unitary Theory

Marxist-Feminist theorists: 'unitary theory' of capitalism, racial, and gender oppression

- *Are race & gender constituted by capitalism or do they have meaningful existence outside of it?*

- *Are patriarchy & white supremacy separate systems that interact with capitalism, or is capitalism a system that necessarily produces relations of racial and gendered domination?*

→ build a bridge between Marxist-Feminism & analytic social ontology

→ Marxian theory can benefit from Haslanger

- practice-dependence of social kinds
- defense of social structural explanations
- critique of methodological individualism

← social ontologists (mode of existence of race, gender) can benefit from adopting Marx's focus

- historical specificity of social kinds
- unique form of asocial sociality historically actualized under capitalism

Tue 21

1. Francis Cheneval: The Social Ontology of the Demos
2. Frank Hindriks: Feasibility & Redundancy: Constraints on Collective Obligations
3. Stephanie Collins: Individual Responsibility for Environmental Norms
4. Temi Ogunye: Towards a theory of rule-focused activism: insights from Bicchieri & Hart
5. Jules Salomone-Sehr: Minimally Shared Activities
6. Kirk Ludwig: Property as a Status Function
7. Felix Pinkert: Finding fault where fault is to be found: Joint ability and the problem of collective harm
8. Olle Blomberg & Björn Petersson: Team reasoning and collective moral obligation
9. Dennis Papadopoulos: Rethinking Shared Intentionality in Great Apes
10. Wil Martens: Intention and large-scale hierarchical planning
11. Randall Westgren: Legitimacy, Identification, and Commitment to Collective Action
12. Tammo Lossau: Craigian Functionalism and Grounding Epistemic Rights
13. Alex Wolf-Root: Sporting Institutions
14. *John Horden: Groups as Pluralities*
15. *Dan López de Sa: Gender Essentialisms*

Francis Cheneval: The Social Ontology of the Demos

What the demos is …

- political entity denoted by "the people" in democracy as "government by the people"

- governing people (demos) is ontologically non-identical with the subjects of government, i.e. the population

→ transitivity problem

- participants are a necessary part of demo (like chess player for chess)

- but do not explain demo

- constitutive rules establish

- unannounced not according the rule … you need observer as well

Frank Hindriks:
Feasibility & Redundancy: Constraints on Collective Obligations

DUTY TO PREVENT HARM

- collective harm prevention requires action from several individuals

two extreme position

- some claim: people never ought to contribute

- some claim: they should always do so

rescuing a drowning: swimmer by forming a human chain
different situations
(1) too few → outcome is not feasible or
(2) too many people are disposed to contribute to harm prevention → contributions are redundant
- risks of infeasibility and redundancy must remain within acceptable limits

BUT whether an individual ought to contribute to harm prevention, depends on what others (are disposed to) do.

- actions of other influence whether an individual has a reasonable chance of helping to preventing the harm

Only when this probability is high enough, does the individual have a duty not to harm.

Stephanie Collins: Individual Responsibility for Environmental Norms

OUR PRACTICES ARE LEADING TO GLOBAL CLIMATE DISASTER - MOST COUNTRIES' GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT DOING ENOUGH

- What should ordinary citizens - individuals do?
  - lack direct control what their states do / can only control what individuals do / capacity as a group member or in their capacity to 'go it alone'
- individuals' primary climate-related obligations
  - require doing what one can towards the creation of social norms
  - individual greenhouse gas emissions do harm (John Broome)

  → generate group-based duties: explained by group membership but held by individuals

climate change:

- primary duty on individuals is a responsiveness duty (Collins 2019)

- → coordination duties require that an individual contributes to the development of new social norms

- development of emissions-reduction social norms is more socially feasible than it may at first appear.

- anti-fossil fuel norms: norms that target for punishment those large corporate agents that extract and burn fossil fuels

Temi Ogunye: Towards a theory of rule-focused activism: insights from Bicchieri & Hart

Social injustice obtains because of the patterns of behavior that are widespread in society → Rules are an important target for those seeking to remedy social injustice

rule-focused activism:= any act that seeks to change patterns of behavior

- remedy social injustice by encouraging compliance with or abandonment of rules

- foundations for a theory of rule focused activism: identify those forms of rule-focused activism that will be effective in different circumstances

Bicchieri

- theory of social norms → wide range of suggestions for how to change problematic patterns of behavior by intervening in social norms

- neglecting laws *(another kind of rule that is just as likely to be implicated in social injustice)*

→ Hart 'The Concept of Law' (2012)

bring Bicchieri's & Hart's theories into conversation with each other

Jules Salomone-Sehr: Minimally Shared Activities

EVEN MINIMALIST VIEW OF SHARED AGENCY TAKE SHARED INTENTIONS ARE NECESSARY

example:
- parkgoers running to a shelter as it suddenly starts raining
- dancers of a company running to that shelter as part of their choreography

accounts of shared agency must explain:

- feature of the sense of 'together': when φ is an activity done together, not all redescriptions of φ will preserve the truth-value of the target sentence

counterexamples: dancers run together to the shelter

- might damage the lawn beyond repair
- but not true that the company trampled and killed the grass together under the sense of 'together' that is the focus of shared agency theory
- ballet dancers need not share the intention to run to the shelter, they could closely stick to their individual choreographical roles ons are not after all necessary for shared agency.

account of shared agency: explain & justify

- substitution failures generated by the relevant sense of 'together'
- shared intentions are not necessary for shared activities

Kirk Ludwig: Property as a Status Function

What are properties?

- a relational status function correlative to status role of owner

status function = agentive function

- special feature: objects can perform it only in virtue of the collective acceptance that they are to have that function
    - → status roles = status functions assigned to agents
    - → ownership = status relation

Things with **status functions** have a role in essentially intentional joint action types that are governed by **constitutive rules.**

Constitutive rules

- partially constitutes the type of activity they govern
- define activities involving items that play a role in them without specifying which particular things are to fill those roles

→ property's function

- defined by duties & rights, subject to consistency with other status role duties and rights

Felix Pinkert: Finding fault where fault is to be found: Joint ability and the problem of collective harm

problem of collective harm:

- situations where several agents bring about or fail to prevent a harm
- **no individual could have made a difference by acting differently**

common description of the problem of collective harm misses a crucial qualification

Fault needs to be found when the agents were jointly able to avoid the harm.

Conclusion

- We must distinguish cases of collective harm that a collection of agents is jointly able to avoid, and those where it is unable to do so.
- Only in cases with joint ability do we need to find fault.
- In cases of joint inability, any position that nonetheless ascribes fault is mistaken.
- The problem of collective harm is thus the problem of finding fault where, and only where, fault needs to be found for a collective harm.

Olle Blomberg & Björn Petersson: Team reasoning and collective moral obligation

ASCRIBING COLLECTIVE MORAL OBLIGATION TO AN UNSTRUCTURED GROUP LACKING THE PROPERTIES USUALLY REQUIRED FOR MORAL AGENCY

- group of unrelated bystanders in a subway car witnessing an assault → group has a moral obligation to stop the assault even if no individual interference would be helpful on its own

- explanation separating subject of the obligation from the putative addressee of the moral demand, with a capacity for moral deliberation is problematic

  → unstructured groups lack a decision procedure, but they can engage in collective deliberation

  → individuals' capacity to regard the situation from a group perspective and to "team reason"

  → gap between subject of the obligation and moral deliberator can be bridged

It makes sense to address such a group collectively and demand that it acts as a collective.

- a group of unrelated bystanders can choose a course of action requiring them to view the situation from a group perspective

Dennis Papadopoulos: Rethinking Shared Intentionality in Great Apes

Michael Tomasello (2016): uniquely human capacities required for shared intentions → great apes do not share intentions

BUT uniquely human capacities are sufficient but not necessary for shared intentionality

- specific interpretation of shared intentionality: Roleplaying Model

- alternative model of shared intentionality: modified Normative Model of shared intentions

→ Margaret Gilbert's theory is compatible with nonhuman shared intentionality

→ Kristin Andrew (2020): animal social norms

prima-facie shared intentionality can be found in great apes

Wil Martens:
Intention and large-scale hierarchical planning

How can we understand that agents execute hierarchically produced plans?

→ Shapiro's concept of planning as decoupled from intentions is inadequate

CLAIM: Action cannot exist without intentions.

- Incentives cannot make intentions desirable.

- two intentional actions:
  - context of a plan
  - context of obtaining an incentive

Randall Westgren: Legitimacy, Identification, and Commitment to Collective Action

HOW **IDENTIFICATION** WITH A COLLECTIVE & **COMMITMENT** TO ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS ARE ANTECEDENTS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION

- more than the social glue that holds the organization together
- requirements for collective (goal-directed economic) action

identification with a collective = two-step social evaluation of

1. expectations of the collective as a token of an organizational type
2. expectation of the collective as a distinctive organization

- commitment scales with 3 different cognitive states: affective, normative, and continuation commitment
- **each form of commitment has different degree of salience**
  - based upon the member's social evaluation of the collective's similarity & distinctiveness for a set of organizational characteristics

→ H1: salience of legitimacy is greater than that of distinctiveness

→ H2: meeting the requirements of the organizational form (type) is more important than expected "distinguishers"

- hypotheses are tested with a unique set of data collected on American wine producing firms and their voluntary collectives. **Both hypotheses are supported.**

Tammo Lossau: Craigian Functionalism and Grounding Epistemic Rights

Idea of a constitutive norm of assertion is best understood in terms of grounding but only if we adopt a Craigian account of knowledge

- epistemic norms:
  under what conditions do we have epistemic right to make an assertion / good predictor of our having or not having these rights

what explains these rights metaphysically?

- way of grounding
  - functionalist approach to knowledge (Edward Craig 1990): grounds for the epistemic right to make an assertion

→ **version of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA)**

- gives a necessary and sufficient condition for having the right to make an assertion

SPORT - COMPETITION VERSUS SOCIAL INSTITUTION

not only a competition but also a social institution

→ guidance on important normative questions in the sporting world

- MacIntyre: contrast between practice & institutions → institutions are at risk of corrupting the values of the practice

But this is too simplistic.

sporting institutions = more complex entity

- values are determined not just by the participants but also by "external forces" such as governing bodies and local social conditions

- youth baseball league

  - determined not just by the values of the players but also by the values of their parents and of the governing administrative organization

- Major League Baseball (MLB)

  - dramatically different values from this youth league, due to the importantly different values of all those involved with MLB

- Recognizing sport as a social institution → questions of eligibility criteria & doping → who counts as a woman for the purpose of sport.

  - e.g. knowing values of sporting institution → determine what substances and actions are undermining in the way required to be doping

Wed 22

1. Charles Mackenzie: Pragmatism without Pluralism: Painting a picture of Social Group Diversity without coloring outside the lines. A Naturalist critique of Thomasson, Ritchie and Epstein

2. Kenneth Ehrenberg: Uptake Grounds Legal Status, but be Careful Whom you Tell

3. Beatrice Sasha Kobow & Bahar Araz: Is there value?

4. Stefano Vincini: What is Infant Emotion Sharing and What Developmental Account Can Explain It?

5. Matthew Chennells: Common knowledge and norms in shared activity

6. Lucy McGowan: The Grounding of Social Resonance

7. Tony Mercer: The social ontology of 12-step recovery

8. David Strohmaier: Social-Computation-Supporting Kinds

9. Andrew Peet: Group Normic Reliabilism

10. Teresa Marques: The Expression of Hate in Hate Speech

11. Line Edslev Andersen: Authorship in Collaborative Research

12. Marcello Ruta: Collective Improvisation as Joint Action A Pledge for an Orientational Approach

13. *Luka Burazin: Legal Office*

14. Joshua Rust:Institutions, Generic Agency, and the Agent-Exclusion Problem

15. S. Orestis Palermos: Bees Do It: Distributed Cognition and Psychophysical Laws

16. Johan Brännmark: Grounding Social Facts

17. Laura Ariadne Martin: A Theory of Oppressive Social Practice

18. Christopher Fruge: Normativity from Nothing

Charles Mackenzie:
Pragmatism without Pluralism: Painting a picture of Social Group Diversity without coloring outside the lines. A Naturalist critique of Thomasson, Ritchie and Epstein

WHAT ARE SOCIAL GROUPS

- either over/under generating what counts as groups: Epstein, Thomasson

diversity: more than one kind of social groups

- Ritchie: (at least) two kinds of groups: organized groups & social kind groups
- how to understand "social" and "diversity"
  - unclear whether diversity in method → variety in kind

CLAIM: social kind groups are not prima facie social groups

- umbrella term = NOT social group BUT social wholes
- → narrow constitutive account of what makes a social group is compatible with diversity of groups
- distinguish between 'socially aware' or 'socially related'
- distinction between social scientific ontology & method
  - principle difference of sociality and what makes a group "social"
  - capture diversity by coloring both inside the lines (ontologically) and outside the lines (methodologically)

Kenneth Ehrenberg:
Uptake Grounds Legal Status, but be Careful Whom you Tell

LAW: A KIND OF FICTION - WE PRETEND INTO EXISTENCE

Legal status = functional element → real-world changes

- depends upon acceptance, internalization, or uptake to work
- the more we understand this, the more we threaten its ability to succeed

Anti-positivists:

- purposes or principles are essential to the meaning of legal texts → claims about law do not depend upon a given court decision

BUT: every legal decision could have been made in another way

- whether judges **discover** the law or **create** it → answered system-by-system,

- examine system from external perspective → denying that judges discover the law

legal theorists & cultural anthropologists take external perspective

no (good) legal reasons for the uptake of legal status

It is likely the only good reasons for that uptake depend upon whatever legitimates legal authority.

Beatrice Sasha Kobow & Bahar Araz: Is there value?

- link notion of value with the notion of institution
- value = institution

CONCLUSION

A value-free theory only has explanatory recourse to a non-agential analysis of behavior (such as with the needs-based understanding of the 'homo oeconomicus') or to a dogmatism that sets values based on conventional authority without reasons or reason.

This implies a particular understanding of the theory of institutional facts as an enabling logical structure which points back to the neo-Kantian roots of the inquiry. Value is a 'plurale tantum' because it is based in the institutional context of a community of agents.

Stefano Vincini: What is Infant Emotion Sharing and What Developmental Account Can Explain It?

Tomasello (2019): "emotion sharing" in infant-caregiver playful interaction

- *sharing in the proper sense of a token-emotion that is shared?*

→ token-identity intuition:

- identity requires a plurality of manifestations of the one that is identical (Schmid 2009)
- pre-reflective individual self-awareness & self-other differentiation as developmental preconditions of sharing (Zahavi & Rochat 2014)
- *empirically plausible developmental account for token-identity intuition?*

→ **pairing account endorses the token-identity intuition**

- empirical evidence in developmental psychology & neuroscience → infant social perception
    (1) underpinned by the same domain-general process of ordinary (non-social) perception
    (2) presupposes pre-reflective sensorimotor experience

- **domain-general process of association by similarity**:
  recognize a token-object as the same across different time points, under different lightening conditions, from different perspectives and distances

- **domain-general process of identification:**
  other's emotion has much in common with the infant's own embodied emotion - infant feels the other's emotion to be the same as his or her own

Matthew Chennells: Common knowledge and norms in shared activity

SHARED INTENTIONAL ACTION → COMMON KNOWLEDGE AS A NECESSARY CONDITION???

- some claim: common knowledge is not a necessary for shared agency
  - psychological attitudes can play their role in coordinating and bringing about the shared activity even in the absence of common knowledge

alternative approach: relationship between common knowledge & normative requirements

- shared agency typically involves some normative relations
  1. Are there any normative requirements that could only be in place if there were common knowledge?
     - certain normative requirements can only be deemed to be in place when there is common knowledge
  2. What are the implications for relevant norms involved in shared agency?
  3. How do the processes by which common knowledge is established influence the kind and content of the normative characteristics involved in a particular instance of shared activity?

→ **common knowledge of agents' intentions** is not necessary for some cases of shared activity

→ norms can be present and play an important role in enabling us to rely on others and in supporting shared activities even in the absence of common knowledge of intentions

Lucy McGowan: The Grounding of Social Resonance

management of organizations → stakeholder theory defines "who and what really counts"
(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997)

- **social media era has altered both "who" has exposure to organizational conduct and "what" organizational conduct is exposed to external stakeholders**

- force of social resonance
→ organizations must be mindful of how their behavior will be reported on social media platforms

social resonance

- occurs when society reacts to salient issues in organizational behavior
- varies from event to event and is fueled by emotionality and commonality

What is driving social resonance?

- a narrative to set up the **context** of the event (people, historical context, location, organizational history)

- understanding the context can help organizations understand what went right and what went wrong in retrospect

- adopting the grounding – anchoring model from social ontology (Epstein, 2015)
  - architecture to frame, ground, and anchor organizational conduct to understand how stakeholders create the social resonance of organizational events
  - recognizing that part of the power social resonance holds is in the context in which the organizational conduct occurs
  - social resonance of an event is a direct measure of the amount of attention stakeholders are giving an organizational event

Tony Mercer: The social ontology of 12-step recovery

TWELVE STEP GROUPS - A USEFUL CASE STUDY

- maxim "I can't, we can" → I mode/we mode distinction in social ontology
- role of twelve step groups & fellowships in maintaining abstinence → collective intentionality & group agency
- downward causation effect of twelve step groups on recovery initiation among new members → extent to which individuals can be ontologically derivative on the social

fellowships - social groups (Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, Cocaine Anonymous)

- various organisational committee at regional, national and international levels and all literature used in group meetings is standardised within each fellowship
- set of cognitive maps and interpretive schemes orient the behavior of individual members → social practices and social tokens

unique structure?

- converted triangle: the bigger one (fellowships) are there to serve the smaller ones

David Strohmaier: Social-Computation-Supporting Kinds

Social kinds are heterogenous

→ different kinds of social kinds

→ social-computation-supporting kinds (SCS-kinds)

- SCS-kinds are united by the function of enabling computations that occur distributed across social groups
  - example: reimbursement form, US Dollar bill, chair of the board
  - status function?!?

- A subset of social kinds

- Function
  - Selectionist
  - Support social computations
  - By being represented appropriately

- Significance
  - Innovation
  - Threat to human autonomy

Andrew Peet: Group Normic Reliabilism

A collective belief is justified only if, given the process via which it was formed would require a deviation from normality. (Smith 2016)

Normic reliabilism

- solves puzzles about justification / recalcitrant problems in the theory of group justification
- independently motivated by knowledge centric approaches to justification

1. **group reliability & individual reliability can come apart:** Large groups can be highly reliable despite their members being only marginally above chance reliable → group level justification floats (almost) entirely free of the bases upon which members form their beliefs

GNR avoids this problems: members beliefs are part of the process for the resultant group belief.

- well-structured deliberative group → false conclusion → explanation needed
- group of unreliable and irresponsible agents → false judgement → no explanation needed

2. **manipulation of evidence problem:** groups can reject evidence they don't like / we can generate justified group beliefs by adding and subtracting group members with the relevant justified beliefs

- *GNR avoids the problem:* process of picking evidence is part of the explanation for the group's belief

Teresa Marques: The Expression of Hate in Hate Speech

- how hate speech expresses hate

  - explain how and when hate speech can correlate with hate crimes

- **hate speech:=
  illocutionarily expressive presupposes ongoing hate as a sentiment which "organizes people's social world and helps strengthening the connection of the ingroup at the expense of various outgroups**

  - no systematicity → expression of personal hatred towards someone doesn't count as hate speech (*systematic effects are illocutionary*)

  - no systematicity assumption → utterances that only express episodic hate emotions may not count as hate speech

- presuppositional view of hate-speech: contexts is illocutionary structured → Stalnakerian set of propositions to which speakers are assertorically committed

- normative requirements:

  - (i) negative appraisals of outgroup members as malevolent just by being members of that group

  - (ii) action tendencies that go from revenge, social exclusion, or attacks to the destruction of the target group

  - (iii) motivation goals (desire to harm, humiliate, or even kill the target)

- when hate speech occurs & is tolerated → updates context with the contents that make hate 'fitting'

- The characteristic action tendencies and motivational goals generated by hate sentiments go to another illocutionarily distinct part of the context (QUDs and plans). And if accommodated, these appraisals are taken for granted and shared by interlocutors.

Line Edslev Andersen: Authorship in Collaborative Research

WHO IS THE AUTHOR OF A PAPER?

(i) the research team as a **whole** OR (ii) some or all of the **individual** team members.

→ answer normative questions about what good and responsible authorship in collaborative research

→ who did the work and is responsible for defending, revising and retracting the work when it is challenged. (who performed and who is required to perform certain actions)

- *existing accounts:* focus on the beliefs of individual team members and how these beliefs are or should be related to the propositions in the paper produced by the research team

HERE: shift of focus from beliefs to actions → collective authorship

before handling normative questions about good and responsible authorship in collaborative research one should clarify collective authorship

Marcello Ruta: Collective Improvisation as Joint Action A Pledge for an Orientational Approach

intentional content of the intention of a joint action: **that** I will do something (with someone else) + **what** I will do (with someone else)

- joint action - not planned in advance
  - collective improvisation,
  - We can plan **that** we will improvise, but we cannot plan **what** we will improvise. →intentional content of a planned collective improvisation is a sort of empty box, an "ad libitum"

- planned collective improvisation
  - generate expectations, both in participants and in non-participants
  - expectations are related to the intentional content of the intention

→ **characterizing intentional content of the intention of a collective improvisation orientationally, in terms of direction of action - NOT in** terms of direction of fit

→ **what is the orientation of my action - NOT** what has to be done

- example: Keith Jarrett's solo improvisations, Peter Elsdon talks of stylistic patterns as "referents" that "provide parameters which guide the generation of music" (Elsdon 2008, 66)

Joshua Rust: Institutions, Generic Agency, and the Agent-Exclusion Problem

Kirk Ludwig: institutions "obviously do not constitute in any ordinary sense a thinking being"

Michael Bratman → possibility of a more "generic" conception of agency for institutions

enactivist theories of mind, philosophy of biology, philosophy of law,
→ flesh out a version of Bratman's provocative suggestion

biologist: sphex wasp digs a burrow for the purpose of laying her eggs

- intentional idiom - "convenience of language" (Ludwig)
- "the notion of agency can itself be understood variously" (Okasha)

    modality of agency which is weaker than full-blown intentional agency but nevertheless captures "a real pattern in nature"

IF relatively simple organisms count as non-intentional, intelligent agents by well-defined criteria THEN those same criteria might reveal a sense in which an institution could also qualify as an agent.

- Dworkin's law as integrity might be a candidate for intelligent agency of this kind

S. Orest Palermos: Bees Do It: Distributed Cognition and Laws

3 FORMS OF ACTIVE EXTERNALISM

extended cognition | extended mind thesis | distributed cognition

cognitive scientists are interested in active externalism as a guide to scientific research programs

objections by common-sense functionalism

- a common line of criticism against extended cognition & extended mind invokes the more scientifically informed alternative of **psycho-functionalism**

    same objection can be raised against the hypothesis of distributed cognition

BUT recent study of the way bee colonies reach decisions on new nest sites

→ arguments for distributed cognition would go through, even if psycho-functionalism were true

This significant observation speaks in defence of active externalism's fitness, at least in the form of the hypothesis of distributed cognition, as a guide to cognitive scientific research.

Johan Brännmark: Grounding Social Facts

ONTOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM WITHIN A GROUNDING-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Taking an ontologically permissivist stance, this form of individualism does not dispute the reality of many macro-level entities or that a variety of facts obtain with respect to these.

→ distinction between basic & derivative social facts

basic social facts:	derivative social facts:
facts about individuals - always substantive	some are non-substantive involve a form of label-sticking

- certain understanding of what is involved in being a war criminal → fact that Genghis Khan was a war criminal
  - merely a non-substantive social fact, but not just about historical distance
- other kinds of cases we might retrospectively (and correctly) identify substantive social facts, even though these were opaque at the time

Laura Ariadne Martin: A Theory of Oppressive Social Practice

CONCEPT OF SYSTEMIC OPPRESSION RAISES A PUZZLE FOR SOCIAL ONTOLOGY

social phenomena understood in terms of the psychological states and actions of individuals

BUT systemic oppression arises from social structures

- promising alternative to an individualistic approach: conceptualizing oppression in terms of practices

How does this framework contribute to our understanding of oppression?

- two conceptions of oppressive social practice (not mutually exclusive)

(1) socialized in a similar environment, 'internalize' similar ideas that are then expressed in how they act	(2) mutually constitutive statuses to agents, which guide action
agents related by virtue of a shared social background	agents related by virtue of statuses they acquire through practice
obscures crucial features of the example: implies that boys act on the basis of ideas about masculinity that they all share	better captures the boys' participation in this practice: highlights that a boy's status is determined by how he acts with respect to the practice's rules and that the statuses in the practice are mutually constitutive

example: C. J. Pascoe's ethnography *Dude, You're a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School.*
'the fag discourse' refers to the games, jokes, and interactions between male students, in which the boys deploy this slur against others as a way to prove their ability to live up to an ideal of masculinity, and to punish those who fail to do so.
This practice oppresses boys who do not live up to this ideal, and harms even those who can.

Christopher Fruge: Normativity from Nothing

TENSION BETWEEN NATURALISM AND THE IS/OUGHT PRINCIPLE

- Naturalism: all facts either be natural or ultimately grounded in solely natural facts.

- The Is/Ought Principle: no normative facts are natural or solely grounded in natural facts.

HERE: Naturalism and the Is/Ought Principle are in fact compatible.

- → framework treating metaphysical grounding as involving both grounds as well as connections between grounds and grounded.

- If the most basic normative facts are null grounded from no grounds but via solely natural connections, then normative facts are generated in a naturalistically acceptable manner that is consistent with normative properties having sui generis normative natures.

- certain normative facts are socially generated by joint intentions.

Null Grounding of Normativity

Natural Fact *Fa* → Grounded Normative Fact *Na*

Null Grounded Normative Property *N*

Intention *that Fx makes Nx*